Many industries are made of a few big firms, which are able to manipulate the market outcome, and of a host of small businesses, each of which has a negligible impact on the market. We provide a general equilibrium framework that encapsulates both market structures. Due to the higher toughness of competition, the entry of big firms leads them to sell more through a market expansion effect generated by the shrinking of the monopolistically competitive fringe. Furthermore, social welfare increases with the number of big firms because the pro-competitive effect associated with entry dominates the resulting decrease in product diversity. Competition among the big and the small Ken-Ichi SHIMOMURA 1 and Jacques-François THISSE 2
Introduction
Many industries are polarized, involving a few large commercial or manufacturing rms, which are able to manipulate the market, and a host of small businesses, each of which has a negligible impact on the market. Examples can be found in apparel, catering, publishers and bookstores, retailing, nance and insurances, hotels, and IT industries. Business scholars such as Porter (1982) stress the fact that rms within the same industry are often clustered in groups with distinct business models and operations. The same holds in international trade, where a few large rms account for the bulk of exports (Bernard et al., 2007) . Standard theories of imperfect competition, which are split between oligopoly and monopolistic competition models, do not reect the nature of such mixed markets. The reason is that these markets blend a small number of large incumbents, which behave strategically, and a monopolistically competitive fringe, in which rms maximize their prots on their residual demand in the absence of strategic interactions.
The purpose of this article is to develop a unied framework to study (i) how large and small rms interact to shape the market outcome and (ii) whether or not it is socially desirable to have large and/or small rms in business. To reach our goal, we combine two standard models of imperfect competition, namely the oligopoly model à la Cournot with symmetrically di erentiated products (Vives, 1999) and the monopolistic competition model developed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) . Specifically, we assume that big rms behave strategically and manipulate market aggregates such as the price index, whereas small rms accurately treat these market aggregates parametrically because they are negligible. This modeling strategy agrees with Aumann (1964) , who suggests to combine a continuum of traders and a few large traders to study market power. Moreover, large and small rms choose their output simultaneously. In addition, although there is a continual ow of rms entering or exiting the market, this process seldom undermines the big rms' position. Consequently, we assume that the mass of monopolistically competitive rms adjust to the number of large rms through the usual process of free entry and exit described in monopolistic competition. By contrast, the entry of large rms is exogenous.
Our main ndings are as follows. First of all, the entry of a large rm generates two opposing e ects. On one hand, as in standard oligopoly theory, entry tends to depress the large incumbents' output. On the other hand, by making competition ercer, the entry of a large rm leads to a shrinking of the monopolistically competitive fringe. 1 This in turn triggers a market expansion e ect that fosters an increase of the large incumbents' output. A priori, the net impact of entry seems to be ambiguous. Our analysis reveals that entry leads to an unambiguous increase in the output of every large rm. 2 Furthermore, the entry of a big rm leads to a decrease in the industry price index 1 Note that there has been in the UK a sharp decline in the number of small groceries after the passage of the Resale Prices Act in 1964 abolishing resale price maintenance (Everton, 1993) . 2 Note that oligopoly theory has identied settings in which entry triggers a price hike; see Chen and Riordan (2008) 2 and to an increase in the output of the industry as a whole. In a nutshell, the addition of a large rm to a market is more powerful in promoting competition than the preservation of small rms. Conversely, restricting the entry of large producers allows a whole range of small rms to survive but makes the market less competitive.
Second, because of the above-mentioned market expansion e ect, when entry arises under the concrete form of a new large rm, the exit of a range of small rms allows the large rms to earn higher prots. Again, this is to be contrasted with the oligopoly case where entry lowers prots. Note the following general equilibrium e ect: higher prots lead to a higher total income, which shifts upward the demand of both large and small rms and generates a richer set of interactions among rms. Lastly, in terms of welfare, we show the unexpected (at least to us) result that, despite the diversity reduction caused by the exit of small rms, the entry of a big rm is benecial to consumers.
It is worth noting that those results are obtained without making specic assumptions about rms'
marginal costs. The only assumption is that these parameters are such that both kinds of rms coexist. Thus, we may safely conclude that the mixed market structure di ers in several respects from the oligopoly setting.
Our analysis also has some competition policy implications which are worth mentioning. Several countries have passed bills that restrict the entry of large rms or the expansion of existing ones, by forbidding price discounts or regulating the hours of operations in order to permit small rms to remain active. To illustrate, consider the case of the retailing sector, which has attracted a lot of attention in several countries. In France, the Royer-Ra arin Law imposes severe restrictions on the entry of department stores whose surface exceeds 300 square meters, the justication being that small shops provide various convenience services. It is worth mentioning here that Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) show that the enforcement of the Royer-Ra arin Law has had a negative impact on job creation in France. This in turn suggests that this regulation has lowered the output and increased the price index of the French retail sector, as suggested by our model. The Net Book Agreement in the United Kingdom between book publishers and retailers forbids discounts on books with the aim of preserving a large network of small bookstores, whereas in France the Lang Law, which also prevents price discounting, is argued by the publishers and small book sellers to be justiable on the same grounds. In the case of Japan, Garon and Mochizuki (1993) argue that small-business associations aim to exchange their political inuence for governmental policies that compensate for their weakness in the marketplace.
Even though the objective of such laws and regulations was often to gain the political support of small-business associations, popular thinking in developed countries has it that small rms allow for a wider array of varieties and services. We nd it fair to say, however, that the public often dismisses the and the references contained therein. However, the reason for price-increasing competition identied by Chen and Riordan are very di erent from ours.
3 fact that the presence of large retailers fosters lower prices than small ones, thus allowing households to increase their consumption (Basker, 2007) . Our analysis conrms that deregulating mixed markets causes the progressive disappearance of small rms. However, by showing that welfare increases with the entry of big rms, it casts doubt on the economic foundations of the various laws and regulations that tend to keep active a large number of small businesses.
The issue addressed in this article is related to, but di erent from, several existing contributions. First, in the dominant rm model, one large rm and a competitive fringe coexist (Markham, 1951) . Our setting markedly di ers from this model. First, it does not capture the above-mentioned diversity e ect because all rms produce the same homogeneous good. Second, the dominant rm is the leader of a Stackelberg game in which the small rms are the followers. In contrast, here all rms play simultaneously and supply di erentiated varieties. There are some similarities, however. In the dominant rm model, the small rms face an increasing marginal costs and a given price; in the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, the small rms face a decreasing marginal revenue and a given marginal cost. Our analysis di ers from Chen (2003) as well as from Gowrisankaran and Holmes (2004) , who use the dominant rm model to study questions di erent from ours. Holmes (1996) also uses the dominant rm model and deals with issues that are related to what we do in this article. In particular, he shows that restricting the size of the dominant rm is detrimental to consumers in the case where the dominant and fringe rms have the same technology.
Note that our results hold in the absence of such restrictions.
Another related contribution is Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) , who study the Cournot-Walras model in which rms rst select quantities, while market prices are established at the Walrasian equilibrium of the resulting exchange economy. Using the so-obtained demands, rms choose their outputs at the Cournot equilibrium. In doing so, rms are aware that they manipulate consumers' demand functions through the redistribution of prots. The main issue encountered with this family of models is the frequent non-existence of an equilibrium (Bonanno, 1990) . One possible way out is considered by Neary (2009) , who assumes a continuum of sectors, each being endowed with a small number of strategic rms. In this case, each rm has a positive impact on its competitors, but no impact on the economy as a whole because each sector is negligible. Thus, prots earned by rms belonging to the same sector have no impact on these rms' demands. The total income e ect a ects rms only through the marginal utility of income. Lastly, while all the above contributions are cast within the framework of noncooperative game theory, a few contributions have studied the interactions between big and small traders in an exchange economy, using cooperative game theory (Gabszewicz and Shitovicz, 1992 ).
The model is described in detail in the next section. Section 3 shows the existence of a mixed market equilibrium and studies its main properties. Because big and small rms have di erent market behavior, we have not been able to derive explicit solutions, which means that our analysis is conducted through implicit expressions. The welfare analysis is taken up in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are given in the appendix.
The model Preferences and demand
The economy involves two goods, two sectors, and one production factor -labor -which is mobile between sectors. The rst good is a horizontally di erentiated good; it is produced under increasing returns and supplied both by oligopolistic and monopolistically competitive rms (MC-rms). The second good, which accounts for the rest of the economy, is homogeneous and produced under constant returns to scale and perfect competition.
The rst issue that we must address is how to model the large and small rms operating in the di erentiated sector. We assume that there are large rms having a positive measure and a mass 0 of small rms having a zero measure. Consequently, each large rm a ects the market whereas each small rm is negligible to the market. Thus, in our setting large and small rms di er in kind unlike Melitz (2003) where all rms are innitesimal in scale. The number of large rms is exogenous but the size of the monopolistically competitive fringe is endogenous. For our setting to account for oligopolistic competition, we assume that 2. That said, we now describe how preferences are dened over the set of varieties.
By convention, variables associated with large rms are denoted by capital letters and those corresponding to small rms by lower case letters. The eld of monopolistic competition being dominated by the CES, we assume that the di erentiated good is formed by two CES-composite goods, 0 and Q 1 , dened as follows:
where is the output level of the small rm [0 ], the output level of the large rm = 1 and 0 1 a given parameter. In the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, consumers' utility depends only upon 0 . By contrast, in oligopoly only Q 1 matters to consumers.
Our aim being to combine both types of competition, we aggregate the two composite goods in the following way:
where Q is the output index of the entire di erentiated sector.
The asymmetric treatment of the large and small rm's outputs, and , and the aggregation in (2), may be justied in the following way. Consider two di erentiated goods, = 0 1 produced 5 by two types of rms. Denoting by the output of a type -rm and by the number of such rms, the CES-composite good is given by
where is the preference parameter associated with good = 0 1. By changing the relative value of 0 and 1 , we change the demands for each type of good and, therefore, the market outcome. To be precise, as 0 steadily decreases with respect to 1 , the equilibrium output of a rm producing good 1 grows while the equilibrium output of a rm producing good 0 shrinks. In this context, (2) may be viewed as the limiting case in which the number 1 of type 1-rms and the parameter 1 0 are given, whereas the preference parameter 0 tends to 0 and the number 0 of type 0-rms becomes arbitrarily large.
Alternatively, we could follow Neary (2010) and Parenti (2010) , who propose to model large rms as producers supplying a continuum of varieties, whereas each small rm supplies a single variety. 3 With single-product rms, diversity in the industry is determined by a trade-o between the cost of introducing a new variety in the market and the associated revenues. In this case, there are no scope economies and entrants do not internalize the business stealing e ect they have on other rms.
With multiproduct rms, the trade-o is more complex due to the presence of scope economies and the internalization of the business stealing e ect among the varieties launched by the same rm (cannibalization). Parenti (2010) shows how to deal with this issue in the case of a quadratic subutility nested into a linear utility.
When the product range is exogenous, the above approach does not di er from that proposed in this article because the coe cient 1 may be reinterpreted as the breadth of the large rms' product range. To be precise, is now the CES-composite good of the varieties supplied by the large rm . The coe cient 1 can be normalized to 1 by choosing appropriately the unit of the real line along which the mass of varieties is measured. This means that the breath of the product range has no impact on our results. Put di erently, how wide is the product range provided by the big rms does not matter for our results. Note, however, that (2) imposes that the length of the product range is xed and the same across large rms. Therefore, our approach takes into account the business stealing e ect but not the cannibalization issue.
Because a consumer endowed with CES preferences may represent a large population of heterogeneous consumers, we simplify notation by assuming that the demand side is described by a representative consumer (Anderson et al., 1992 ). This agent is endowed with units of labor, holds the shares of all rms, and has a preference relation represented by the following utility function:
where the industry output index Q is given by (2), while is the consumption of the homogeneous good and a given parameter satisfying the inequality 0 1. The upper-tier utility being of the Cobb-Douglas type, the homogeneous good is always produced and consumed. Without loss of generality, we assume that one unit of labor produces one unit of the homogeneous good. We choose this good as the numéraire. Therefore, the equilibrium wage is equal to 1. Our primary purpose being to investigate how large and small rms interact on the product market, assuming that workers' wage is given allows us to isolate this e ect from other considerations such as the working of the labor market.
Observe that the process of substitution between the two kinds of goods is more involved than in standard oligopoly or monopolistic competitive models. To illustrate how it works, consider the situation in which the quantities are the same and equal to , whereas the output density is uniform and equal to . If an additional variety + 1 becomes available in quantity , the total mass of negligible varieties that leaves the utility level unchanged must decrease by = ( ) . In other words, the entry of variety + 1 triggers the exit of a positive range of varieties supplied by the MC-subsector.
The representative consumer maximizes her utility subject to
is the price of variety = 1 , the price of variety [0 ], and Y the income level given by the wage bill plus prots. Note that the value of the income Y is endogenous because prots are determined at the equilibrium. The income share spent on the di erentiated good being constant, we set y Y. It is well known that the price index of the MC-subsector is given by
and thus the industry price index P is
Clearly, the industry price index increases with the price of any variety as well as with the price index 0 of the MC-subsector.
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The inverse demand functions are given by
Hence, small rms face demands having the same constant price-elasticity, whereas large rms'
demands displays a variable price-elasticity because P changes with . Furthermore, holding y constant, both demands are decreasing in their own output, while 0 for 6 = . Substituting (6) and (7) into (5) yields the industry price index as a function of the industry output index and income:
Large rms
It follows from (6) that the prots of the large rm is given by
where 0 is the constant marginal cost and the xed cost. Note that xed costs do not play any role in Section 3. They are needed for the welfare analysis conducted in Section 4.
Any large rm is aware that its output choice a ects the industry price index P and is, therefore, involved in a game-theoretic environment. It also understands that P is inuenced by the aggregate behavior of the MC-rms expressed by 0 . 4 Last, as shown by (6) and (7), the income level inuences rms' demands, whence their prots. As a result, all rms must anticipate correctly what the total income will be.
Because they have a positive measure, the large rms should be aware that they can manipulate the income level, whence their demands, through their output choices (the Ford e ect). However, accounting for such feedback e ects often leads to the nonexistence of an equilibrium, the reason being that prot functions are not quasi-concave (Roberts and Sonnenschein, 1977) . 5 In what follows, we consider a di erent approach and assume that large rms treats y parametrically. In other words, large rms behave like income-takers. 6 This approach is in the spirit of Hart (1985) for whom rms should take into account only some e ects of their policy on the whole 4 Because the upper-tier utility is of the Cobb-Douglas type, the manipulation of the price index has no impact on the income share spent on the di erentiated product. 5 A noticeable exception is d 'Aspremont et al. (1996) , who take the Ford e ect into account and solve the general equilibrium CES model with oligopolistic rms. However, unlike ours their setting is symmetric. This vastly simplies their analysis. 6 The same di culty arises when governments, clubs or developers providing a public good manipulate strategically the utility level. The corresponding public economics literature thus relies on the assumption that these big agents are utility-takers (Scotchmer, 2002) .
economy. It also concurs with Neary (2009) when the sector under consideration is small ( is close to 0) or when each large rm within its sector is small in the economy as a whole. Note that the income-taking assumption does not mean that prots have no macroeconomic impact. It means that no large rm seeks to manipulate its own demand through the income level, which seems reasonable in large and diversied economies (recall that the total wages paid by the large rms are taken into account in ).
Accordingly, although our model does not capture all feedback e ects, it is a full-edged general equilibrium model in which large rms account for (i) strategic interactions within their group,
(ii) the aggregate behavior of the small rms, and (iii) the endogenous income generated by prot distribution. In other words, our model is not a partial equilibrium one, the di erence being that the income level is exogenous in a partial equilibrium model whereas it is endogenous here.
) be the vector of all outputs but that of rm . Because is strictly decreasing in , we have:
and any given Q and 0 is strictly concave with respect to .
Hence, rm 's best reply (Q 0 ; y) is the unique solution to the rst-order condition:
Small rms
Being innitesimal in scale every small rm accurately treats the industry price index and the income as given parameters. The di erence in rms' behavior reects the di erence in the underlying market structure that characterizes each subsector.
The prot of the small rm [0 ] is given by ( ; P y) = y 1 P where 0 is the constant marginal cost and 0 the xed cost. Observe that large and small rms are homogeneous within their own group but heterogeneous between groups. Because 1, ( ; P y) is strictly concave in . Applying the rst-order condition yields the equilibrium price of a small rm =
which is the same as the price prevailing under monopolistic competition. By contrast, a small rm's equilibrium output
varies with the quantities chosen by the large rms through the price index P and the income y.
Substituting (12) into (4) and (1) in (11), we obtain:
In words, the price index 0 of the monopolistically competitive fringe depends only upon its size: the larger , the lower 0 . Although the equilibrium price of each variety is independent of , (14) implies that a larger mass of small rms makes competition tougher through more fragmented individual demands, thus leading to a lower price index 0 . This shows how the size of the monopolistically competitive fringe a ects the intensity of competition in the whole industry.
For any given and , (12) also implies that the equilibrium prot of a small rm is given by
3 The market outcome
We consider a non-cooperative game in which big and small rms choose their output simultaneously. The market equilibrium is dened as a state in which the following conditions hold: (i) the representative consumer maximizes her utility subject to the budget constraint, (ii) both large and small rms maximize their own prots with respect to output, (iii) large rms earn positive prots, (iv) the mass of MC-rms is adjusted until prots are zero or no MC-rm operates:
and (v) all markets clear. When 2 and 0, we say that the market equilibrium is mixed. For any given 2, we may characterize the mixed market equilibrium by means of the following four conditions: (i) the prot-maximization conditions of small rms, (ii) the prot-maximization conditions of large rms, and (iii) the zero-prot condition for small rms. In this way, we consider 0 as a "pseudo-player" who chooses the mass of small rms non-strategically.
Existence of a mixed market equilibrium
Consider a mixed market equilibrium in which the large rms choose the same output sold at the same price , whereas the small rms produce the same output . 7 Hence, symmetry prevails within each group of rms but not between groups.
Our analysis involves two steps: (i) we calculate the equilibrium conditions when the size of the MC-subsector is xed and (ii) we determine the equilibrium value of .
Step 1. The total income Y is implicitly given by
Furthermore, (8) implies
Using this expression, we can rewrite the rst-order condition (10) as follows:
The four equations (13), (16), (17) and (18) yield the equilibrium values of 0 ( ), ( ), y( ) and P( ). Plugging y( ) and P( ) into (P y), we obtain the prot function ( ) in terms of only.
We start with the following result, the proof of which is given in Appendix A.
Lemma 2. For any given value of , the equilibrium prot of an MC-rm ( ) is a strictly decreasing function of .
Thus, the entry and exit process of small rms yields a unique and stable solution to the zero-prot condition ( ) = 0. Furthermore, Lemma 2 and (15) imply that the monopolistically competitive fringe shrinks when the xed cost rises.
We now come to the impact of on prices. We already know that 0 decreases with . The impact of on the common price charged by the large rms and on the industry price index is less straightforward. In Steps 1 and 2 of Appendix A, we show that increasing leads to lower values for ( ) and P( ). This is because the entry of small rms intensies competition between the two groups of rms, which in turn strengthens competition within the group of large rms and results in a lower price .
To sum-up, we have:
Assume that the size of the MC-subsector is exogenous. Then, both the industry price index and the price at which the large rms sell their output decrease when the mass of small rms increases.
Therefore, the market reacts as if the monopolistically competitive fringe were a single big rm producing 0 . This conrms the idea that the MC-subsector may be viewed as a pseudo-player. It should be kept in mind, however, that 0 is not the output chosen by this pseudo-player. It stems from the aggregation of production decisions made by a myriad of small rms. Note also that we do not know yet how 0 varies with .
Step 2. Using (15), the zero-prot condition = 0 is equivalent to
Hence, under free entry in the MC-subsector the equilibrium values of y and P are inversely related.
Plugging (19) into (12), we obtain = (1 ) which is identical to the equilibrium size of a rm under monopolistic competition. Therefore,
To put it simply, under free entry the output index of the monopolistically competitive fringe is determined by the sole mass of MC-rms. Consequently, the small rms adjust to market changes through entry or exit only.
Last, it follows from (8) and (19) that the industry price index P decreases with the industry output index Q. Hence, under free entry and variable income, the downward sloping relationship between price and quantity holds at the aggregate level.
The mixed market equilibrium ( , P , y , ) is determined by the four conditions (16)- (19) .
Because there are two kinds of rms whose market behavior di ers, showing the existence of an equilibrium not standard. Furthermore, it should be clear that restrictions on the parameters must be imposed for a mixed market equilibrium to exist. If the xed cost ( ) is high relative to the market size , no small (large) rm operate. Therefore, we must nd the conditions under which the two kinds of rms are active in equilibrium.
In Appendix B.1, we show that the market outcome involves a monopolistically competitive fringe Accordingly, the domain of the ( )-plane for which a mixed market equilibrium prevails is dened by the intersection of the two sets delineated by ( ) = and = ( ; ).
It is non-empty because is strictly decreasing with ( ; 0) 0, while is strictly increasing with (0) = 0. Consequently, we have:
Proposition 2 For any given such that 2 , there exists a unique mixed market equilibrium if and only if µ ¶ µ ; ¶
In Figure 1 , we depict the domain of parameters in which such a mixed market equilibrium exists. Depending on the relative values of and , the economy may have a handful of big rms and/or a myriad of small rms. In particular, increasing the value of leads to the widening of the range of ( )-values for which the market involves large rms only. This is because it becomes harder for small rms to survive. In contrast, when increases, the range of ( )-values for which the market involves small shrinks. As shown below, this is caused by an income e ect that stems from the general equilibrium nature of our setting.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Because is decreasing in 2, arbitrarily large at = 1, and negative when tends to innity, the equation µ ; ¶ = has a unique solution¯ . In other words, = 0 and 0 = 0 when is larger than or equal to¯ .
As to be expected, when the level of xed costs in the MC-subsector gets lower, more big rms are needed to trigger the disappearance of the monopolistically competitive fringe. 
The latter is obtained by combining two other equilibrium conditions. Solving the prot-maximizing condition (18) for P and plugging the resulting expression into the zero-prot condition (19) leads to the condition
which relates and y at the equilibrium; 0 is a bundle of parameters (see Appendix B.2). Solving this expression with respect to y, we obtain
which denes a second relationship between the equilibrium values of and Y. In words, the equation (22) gives the large rms' prot-maximizing output when these rms expect the total income to be equal to any given value. By construction, the two curves (21) and (22) intersect at the equilibrium values of Y and . Figure 2 shows that, for any value of , these curves intersect only once.
Insert Figure 2 about here
The industry structure
The aim of this subsection is to study how the two subsectors are a ected by the entry of a large rm. Our rst two results highlight how the two subsectors react to the addition of a big competitor.
(i) When the number of large rms rises, Figure 2 shows that the curve (21) is shifted upward.
By contrast, the curve (22) is una ected. As a result, when the number of large rms increases from 1 to 2 , the equilibrium output rises from 1 to 2 .
Proposition 3
In a mixed market, the entry of a large rm leads the large incumbents to raise their output.
It seems natural to ask whether Proposition 3 is due to the mixed nature of the market or to the income e ect generated by the redistribution of prots? To answer this question, we isolate the income e ect by considering the impact of entry in a market involving only oligopolistic rms. In this case, as shown by (B.12), rms' output is given by
Di erentiating this expression with respect to for 2 shows that decreases with .
Accordingly, we need a mixed market structure for the output growth e ect to occur.
(ii) We now show how the monopolistically competitive fringe reacts to the entry of a large rm. Using the expression of ( ) given by (A.9) in Appendix A, it is readily seen that ( ) decreases with for any given while ( ) is shifted downward when increases. Therefore, the equilibrium mass of small rms ( ) must decrease with .
Proposition 4
In a mixed market, the entry of a large rm leads to a shrinking of the monopolistically competitive fringe.
This result is in accordance with Basker (2007) who observes that, in the U.S. retail sector, WalMart's competitive pressure has caused other stores, especially small ones, to shut down. Disregarding its productive advantage, its suggests that the entry of Wal-Mart should have increased the sales of Target, that is, the second-largest discount retailer in the United States, at the expense of small retailers.
The above two propositions may be combined to describe the main forces at work in a mixed market. By contracting the monopolistically competitive fringe, the entry of a large producer triggers a market expansion e ect that allows the large incumbents to increase their output. For this market expansion e ect to arise there must be a monopolistically competitive fringe that acts as a bu er.
This reveals the existence of a trade-o between the two subsectors: when one subsector grows, the other declines (see Proposition 1).
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is now clear. The small rms have a strategic advantage in dealing with the large ones because they do not take into account the impact of their output decisions on the industry price index. This enables the small rms to commit to a larger output than they would if the MC-subsector acted as a group. Indeed, in this case we would be back to a pure oligopolistic world in which entry leads the incumbents to contract their outputs (see B.12). Simply put, as small rms gradually exit the market, the large rms take advantage of the disappearance of such "aggressive" competitors to expand their output. 8 We need two more properties of the equilibrium to complete our study of the interactions between the two kinds of rms.
(iii) When the number of large rms increases from 1 to 2 , Figure 2 shows that the equilibrium income from Y 1 to Y 2 . Because the functions + ( ) and ( ) behave alike and because ( ) increases with over the interval ]0 ¯ [, it follows immediately that:
Proposition 5 In a mixed market, the entry of a large rm raises the prot of each large incumbent.
This unsuspected result is the outcome of the interplay between several intertwined e ects. First, as seen above, when a new rm enters the market, the mass of small rms decreases, which generates a market expansion e ect that allows the big rms to expand their output and prots. This is to be contrasted with the oligopoly case in which individual output and prots decrease because the large rms do not benet from the above market expansion e ect. Furthermore, higher prots result in a higher income which fuels the expansion of the market for each kind of rms. All else equal, this allows a larger number of small rms to stay in business. Even though this e ect slows down the exit of small rms (see Proposition 1), it is not su ciently strong to break it o .
The role of the income e ect is highlighted by assuming that prots are redistributed to absentee shareholders. In this case, the curve Y = is at, and thus the equilibrium output is una ected by entry. However, the market expansion e ect is still at work in such a partial equilibrium setting because the output produced in the oligopoly case decreases with the addition of a large rm. Yet, the mixed market must be cast within a general equilibrium frame to pin down the output growth e ect stressed in Proposition 3.
(iv) It remains to determine the impact of an increase in the number of large rms on prices. It follows from (19) that P and y move in opposite directions. Proposition 5 therefore implies that P decreases with . Because decreases with , (14) implies that 0 increases. As a result, it must be that the equilibrium price decreases with . To sum-up, we have:
In a mixed market, both the industry price index and the price at which the large rms sell their output decrease when the number of large rms increases.
Thus, the addition of a large rm makes the whole market more competitive. Even though the exit of MC-rms tends to render the market less competitive (see Proposition 1) , this e ect is dominated by the pro-competitive e ect generated by the expansion of big rms' output (see Proposition 3). rms' markup exceeds the small rms' markup, which reects the fact that the former have more market power than the latter. Thus, when both kinds of rms share the same marginal cost, the large rms price their varieties at a higher level than the small rms, thus conrming the above-mentioned idea that the small rms are more competitive than the big ones. Note, however, that the price ranking is reversed when the large rms have a sizable cost advantage.
Finally, because the entry of a large rm leads to a lower industry price index, combining (8) Before concluding, it is worth noting that the foregoing analysis sheds light on some of the major trends characterizing the market dynamics in developed economies. Traditional economies were typically populated with small businesses and very few large rms. More a uent societies and technological progress have combined to facilitate the entry of a growing number of big rms. This in turn has triggered the decline of the small business subsector in mixed markets endowed with old and small rms as well as the growth of modern big rms (Mokyr, 2002) . Eventually, when the number of large rms became su cient large ( exceeds¯ ), the monopolistically competitive fringe disappeared from the market.
However, our analysis also suggests that the fall in small rms' xed costs sparked by the development of the new information technologies has permitted the revival of SMEs. Indeed, as predicted by our model, the launching of small rms became again protable from the 1980s, which has led to the progressive emergence of new mixed markets. The evolution of markets, therefore, seems to be a nonmonotone process, involving the transition from monopolistic competition to mixed markets through markets dominated by large oligopolistic rms. It is worth stressing that this discussion agrees with a well-documented fact stressed in the business literature on entrepreneurship, that is, the existence of a U-shaped relationship between the levels of entrepreneurship and economic development (see Wennekers et al., 2010 for a survey and empirical evidence).
Welfare
The propositions derived in the above section open the door to welfare issues that we now investigate.
Our purpose is not to conduct a rst best analysis. Instead, we aim to determine whether or not the entry of a large rm is welfare-enhancing, which is precisely the question raised in political debates.
Because preferences (3) are homothetic, the level of social welfare may be described by the indirect utility corresponding to the utility of the representative consumer. 9 Substituting (6) and (7) into (3), we obtain the indirect utility:
When increases, Proposition 5 implies that Y increases whereas Proposition 6 tells us that P goes down. Therefore, we have:
In a mixed market, the entry of a large rm raises social welfare.
In words, this result means that a di erentiated market with a few big rms and many small rms is less e cient than a market with more big rms and fewer small rms. This runs against the conventional wisdom according to which a multitude of small rms does better in terms of social e ciency than a handful of large ones. This contrast in results is due to the fact that the mixed market model allows for direct comparisons of di erent market structures within a unied framework, thus shedding new light on their relative merits. It is also worth stressing that the above proposition is obtained in the case of a di erentiated industry in which consumers have a preference for diversity.
To be precise, Proposition 7 shows that the pro-competitive e ect associated with the presence of large rms dominates the decrease in diversity generated by the exit of several small rms. We want to stress that Proposition 7 imposes no specic restriction on the parameters of the economy, apart from those stated in Proposition 2 that guarantee the existence of a mixed market equilibrium.
Concluding remarks
Mixed markets are plentiful in the real world, one reason being that keeping a monopolistically competitive fringe seems to be a political concern in several countries. Yet, our analysis suggests that consumers may gain from the presence of large rms because they render the market more competitive. Nevertheless, both in the public and the general press, it is customary to nd the idea that the "small business" world of yesterday was more appealing than the "large business"
world of today. Although sectors dominated by a few big rms were often more standardized than those involving many small producers, our analysis shows that consumers need not be better o under many small producers rather than under a handful of large ones. This is because the diversity argument put forward by interest groups ignores the pro-competitive e ect that the entry of big rms brings about. Admittedly, our results are obtained in the case of a specic model, namely the CES.
Being aware of its limits, we want to stress that this model is the workhorse of many contributions dealing with imperfect competition in modern economic theory. So our results cannot be dismissed on that basis only. Using a quadratic subutility nested into a linear utility, Parenti (2010) shows that the size of the monopolistically competitive fringe shrinks with the entry of a multiproduct rm.
The same author also proves that the social surplus rises with the addition of a big rm (personal communication). Thus, our main results are robust against this alternative specication.
To conclude, observe that our setting can be applied to study various issues that have been investigated using the framework of monopolistic competition only. The rst question that comes to mind is the opening to trade of two economies that have di erent mixed markets. Our analysis suggests that, by exacerbating competition between large rms, economic integration triggers the progressive disappearance of small rms. This would have the following important implication: if large rms have lower marginal costs than small rms, then trade liberalization would yield productivity gains in both countries. Second, it is worth studying the impact of large department stores or shopping malls that locate at the outskirts of a city, while competing with a large number of small shops located at the city center. In such a context, we conjecture that the exit of small shops make consumers living downtown worse-o when they have a bad access to the shopping malls.
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Appendix A
We show that P( ), ( ) and ( ) decrease with . To simplify notation, we set
Step 1. Consider rst the impact on P( ) of increasing . Substituting (13) into (17) and simplifying, we obtain:
Substituting this expression into (18), we obtain
Using (A.1), we may rewrite (A.3) as follows:
The function increases with , and is such that (0) = 0 and ( ) when 1. Therefore, for any given , (A.4) has a unique solution ( ) ]0 1[, which increases with . It then follows from (A.3) that P( ) decreases with .
Step 2. Using (6) and (A.2), the equilibrium price set by a large rm is such that
Because P( ) decreases and ( ) increases with , it must be that ( ) decreases with .
Step 3. (A.5) implies that the prot of a large rm is given by
Substituting (A.6) and (15) into (16) yields
Furthermore, it is readily veried that (A.3) is equivalent to
Replacing in (A.7) yields the equilibrium income:
where
The numerator of (A.9) is decreasing in , whereas the denominator ( ) is increasing because P( ) decreases and ( ) increases with . Consequently, for any given the function ( ) must decrease with .
Appendix B
Step 1. We rst determine a necessary and su cient condition for a positive range of small rms to be in business in equilibrium.
Using given by (A.1), we may rewrite the two equilibrium conditions (16) and (18) as follows: Thus, there is a monopolistically competitive fringe if and only if this condition holds.
Step 2. We now show that there exists a unique mixed market equilibrium. Using (6), the prot of a large rm evaluated at a symmetric outcome is given by
The zero-prot condition (19) may be rewritten as follows: Observe that ( ) increases with whereas ( ) is independent of (see Figure 2) .
It is readily veried that (i) ( ) is concave and increasing, (ii) ( ) is convex and increasing, with (0) (0) = 0, and (iii) ( ) ( ) tends to when =¯ . As a consequence, (B.7) has a unique positive solution . Note that is smaller than¯ because ( ) tends to at¯ .
Step 3. It remains to nd a necessary and su cient condition for the large rms' prots to be positive at , that is, a condition for ( ) 0 to hold.
It follows from the properties of and that 
